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a b s t r a c t
We established realness as the relatively stable tendency to act on the outside the way one feels on the
inside, without regard for proximal personal or social consequences. In nine studies, we showed that real-
ness is a) a core feature of individual differences in authenticity, b) generally adaptive but largely unre-
lated to agreeableness, c) highly stable, d) reliably observable in dyadic behavior, and e) predictive of
responses to situations with potential for personal or social costs. Informants both perceive agreeable
motives in real behavior and recognize that being real can be disagreeable. We concluded that realness
represents an important individual difference construct that is foundational for authentic social behavior,
and that being real comes with both costs and benefits.
 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
There are times in life when it is difficult to know whether or
not to reveal your true thoughts, feelings, and desires. For instance,
what do you do when you are annoyed by a friend who is being
rude to restaurant staff? Or, what do you do when a new romantic
partner is publicly affectionate in a way that makes you feel
uncomfortable? How do you handle a situation in which someone
you know is clearly upset by something, but seems reticent to tell
you what the problem is? What if you like someone but are too
nervous to say so, and find yourself instead expressing your liking
by teasing them, and giving the wrong impression? Being explicit
in these situations comes with risks for yourself and others. It
can make situations uncomfortable or awkward, or convey the
wrong impression. This can, in turn, have negative long-term
effects. On the other hand, it can feel fake to hide the way you think
or feel, and this can also come with both short- and long-term
costs. Most people can readily identify friends who would almost
certainly confront a rude friend, establish boundaries about public
affection with a new date, ask someone what is bothering them, or
express genuine liking in situations like those described above. For
such people, expressing themselves directly seems to trump other
concerns. These kinds of people are real, even in moments with
potential personal and social costs.
We use the term realness to mean behaving on the outside the
way one feels on the inside, without regard for proximal personal
or social consequences. We situate realness within the broader
concept of authenticity. However, whereas we understand authen-
ticity as a dynamic, multidimensional process, we conceptualize
realness as a more specific, core feature of that process that is
revealed only in certain social conditions. Specifically, we under-
stand realness as important for authenticity because it reflects
stable individual differences in the tendency to be authentic when
situations apply pressure to do otherwise. This pattern of behavior
and its potential downsides was a major emphasis of classical
models of authenticity that is mostly missing in contemporary
empirical research and assessment tools. In particular, realness
has been hidden by a strong positive valence in authenticity ques-
tionnaires and efforts to include other features that may support
authentic behavior, such as inner values, self-awareness, or various
styles of external expression.
In the introduction that follows we describe how realness has
been described in classical theories of personality, with particular
attention to distinguishing realness from the broader and more
complex construct of authenticity. We then review empirical work
on authenticity, to highlight how realness has become obscured by
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methodological and conceptual issues in contemporary research.
We then present a series of nine studies in which we generate a
measure of realness by uncovering the core and common behav-
ioral dimension within existing authenticity measures, removing
the positive valence from that dimension, and examining how it
relates to a variety of theoretically relevant variables. We conclude
based on the results of these nine studies that realness represents
an important individual difference construct that is foundational
for authentic social behavior, and that being real comes with both
costs and benefits.
1.1. Realness in personality theory
A review of classical theories of realness and related concepts in
the personality literature reveals certain trends and consistencies
regarding its nature and consequences.
1.2. Realness is healthy
Realness has been regarded as a principal outcome of healthy
development and/or effective psychotherapy, a point that has been
especially stressed by clinically oriented theorists. Jung (1939)
described a true self that lies beneath defensive personas and that
is capable of growth and contact with meaningful symbolism.
Winnicott (1958) distinguished the true vs. false self in personality,
the former being whole and unified whereas and the latter at risk
of splitting, dissociation, and incoherence. Horney (1951) asserted
that the real self is ‘‘the alive, unique, personal center of ourselves,
the only part that can and wants to grow” (p. 155) but warned that
‘‘under stress, the person will become alienated from his real self ‘‘
(p. 13) whereas ‘‘if nourished, the real self surges toward self-
realization” (p. 17). Early existentialists held this pattern of behav-
ior up as among the highest touchstones of moral achievement
(Boss, 1963; Heidegger, 1927; Kierkegaard, 1849), with outcomes
that not only reflect personal health and well-being, but which also
have positive effects for relationships and society. These perspec-
tives highlight that realness has generally been considered, by the-
orists of various persuasions, as an outcome of psychological
maturation, health, and adjustment.
1.3. Realness has downsides
Theorists have also consistently stressed the balance between
the upsides and downsides of authentic behavior (see Jongman-
Sereno & Leary, 2019). There is a reason people often censor what
they say or how they behave; unmitigated realness can hurt or
embarrass other people or the self. In personal relationships, social
tact often involves holding back, whereas people often regret hav-
ing revealed how they truly feel during moments of emotional dys-
regulation. At a social level, being real in the political sphere can
garner support from a politician’s base but sow divisions at the
national level (Rosenblum, Schroeder, & Gino, 2019).
The personal downsides of benevolent realness have received
significant theoretical attention. For Kierkegaard (1844), being
authentic inevitably conflicts with being a reliable member of
social institutions. It is lonely, alienating, and produces feelings
of dread. Rogers (1961) put a fine point on this aspect of authentic-
ity by emphasizing that it requires lessening the influences of
‘‘oughts”, expectations, and needs to please others. He urged peo-
ple in the direction of autonomy despite various pressures to fit
in. Maslow (1968), who thought of authenticity as the cardinal
behavioral indicator of self-actualization and viewed the authentic
person as ‘‘complete and final in some sense” (p. 123), asserted that
‘‘he” (sic.) must ‘‘transcend his culture” (p. 16) and generally
underscored that risks of self-actualization include social ostracism
and being seen as proud, arrogant, or indifferent. He also warned
how self-actualized realness may not be particularly popular, even
if the self-actualized person is working towards social causes larger
than themselves (the upshot of his perspective, though, is that the
self-actualizing person will not care all that much). May (1953, p.
193) asserted that ‘‘people lack courage (to be their authentic
selves) because of fear of being isolated. . .. laughed at, ridiculed,
or rejected” and held up Socrates and Spinoza, two philosophers
celebrated for rejecting social norms at tremendous personal costs
in order to achieve authentic expression, as prototypes.
Indeed, many famous martyrs for noble causes suffered greatly
from being real. Martin Luther King, Jr. was murdered by a reac-
tionary and Galileo was subjected to an undignified funeral as a
consequence of their efforts to hasten human progress by speaking
truth to power. Sojourner Truth and Thomas Paine advanced their
causes with unusual risk and valor and at tremendous personal
cost. The #MeToo Movement or American athletes who kneel dur-
ing the U.S. national anthem provide more contemporary examples
that are surely complemented by less public instances that the
reader could easily call to mind. Of course, there are also many
converse examples, in which people with antisocial motives
caused harm by being real.
In contrast, there may also be advantages to certain forms of
inauthentic behavior. Deceit has been taken for granted and even
extolled as a political mechanism (Machiavelli, 1513/1916; von
Rochau, 1853). A particularly nefarious version of deceit has to
do with seeming to be real to one’s political base, in a way that
is offensive or divisive to society in general. For instance, populist
leaders have summoned racist or classist instincts among citizens
as a tactic to engender support, with the implication that they
are simply being honest rather than politically correct. To be clear,
we do not know if such individuals were being real (whether they
were personally racist or classist) or whether they were using a
politically advantageous strategy, just as we cannot know if people
who are being agreeable are being real when it is to their advan-
tage. But in many cases, there is reason to suspect that the strategy
was more important in such people than an honest expression of
their inner values (we leave room for the likelihood that some
world leaders have simply been really bad people). Humor, which
is often literally or at least concretely inauthentic (e.g., in sarcasm
and irony a person says things they do not mean) is generally asso-
ciated with positive outcomes (Kuiper, Martin, & Olinger, 1993),
particularly when it is good natured (Barnett & Deutsch, 2016;
Leist & Müller, 2013). Lerner (1993) suggested that it may be adap-
tive for women trying to cope with sexism to avoid realness, at
least in certain contexts, because asserting one’s views directly
can have disparately negative attributions for women relative to
men. These examples augur a second commonality in classical the-
ories of realness: it may have both good and bad consequences for
the individual and society. In particular, in some cases realness can
come across as disagreeable or impolite, disrupt social harmony,
and alienate the person who has been real, even if a person has
good intentions. Conversely, if a person truly has unseemly
thoughts and feelings, expressing those thoughts and feelings, or
being real, can cause harm to self and others, particularly to the
degree that such individuals are politically powerful.
1.4. Being real is a core aspect of the broader concept of authenticity
The third thread in this tapestry is more complicated still. What
are the processes and components that give rise to behavioral real-
ness, and how do they fit together? From an existential perspec-
tive, the essence of personal development involves escaping the
nihilism that comes with recognizing that there is no objective
purpose to life, and creating a subjective meaning to which per-
sonal energy, values, and behaviors can be attached (Sartre,
1946). Fundamental to this essence is the use of one’s inner life
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to guide external behavior. Rogers famously described this con-
struct – which he variously referred to as genuineness, congruence,
authenticity, and realness – as both a principal outcome of effec-
tive therapy (Rogers, 1961, p. 165) and one of the three necessary
and sufficient characteristics of effective psychotherapists (Rogers,
1957). He asserted that realness occurs when ‘‘the feelings the per-
son is experiencing are available to him (sic.), available to his
awareness, and he is able to live these feelings, be them, and is able
to communicate them” (Rogers, 1961p. 61). From his perspective,
being real allows a person to accept whatever comes their way
and act in a way that is adaptive, because ‘‘he” has ‘‘trusted his gut”
and acted upon his inner experience in a specifically specified class
of situations.
The view that realness has essentially to do with acting on the
outside the way one feels on the inside is common (c.f., ‘‘genuine-
ness” in Ryan & Ryan, 2019) but it has typically been wrapped in
the trappings of a more complicated, dynamic, multifaceted
process, under the rubric of authenticity. For instance, the central
distinction of Deci and Ryan’s (1985; 2000) highly generative
Self-Determination Theory (SDT) is between authentic and exter-
nal motivations for behavior. In the SDT model, authentic motiva-
tions are intrinsic and self-authored goals organized to achieve a
sense of competence, relatedness, and autonomy. Authentic
motives are at perpetual risk of stultification by external, environ-
mental motives; seemingly benign or even positive reinforcers like
verbal praise, financial compensation, or public reward can dull
inner motives for authentic living (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999).
Kernis and Goldman (2006) understand the disposition to be
authentic as involving four components that are measured using
separate scales on their questionnaire: being aware of one’s inner
states, processing those states in a way that is relatively free from
bias, expressing those states in behavior, and being particularly
motivated to be genuine in close relationships. Wood et al.
(2008) conceptualize authenticity as a process of a) an inner expe-
rience of self, b) accurate awareness of that inner experience, and
c) expression of that inner experience. Their questionnaire contains
three corresponding scales: self-alienation, authentic living, and
accepting external influences. The idea is that self-alienation pre-
vents accurate awareness, and that either variation in the motive
to be authentic (authentic living) or susceptibility to other motives
(external influences) can interfere with authentic expression.
Sheldon, Davidson, and Pollard (2004) apprehend authenticity as
a character trait that describes people who are true to themselves
and accurately represent their internal states (feelings), intentions
(thoughts), and commitments (behaviors). Although there is varia-
tion in these sub-scale structures, they have in common a distinc-
tion between internal (i.e., awareness) and external (i.e., behavior)
domains of authenticity (Knoll, Meyer, Kroemer, & Schröder-Abé,
2015).
Overall, these models share the assumption that authentic
behavior is the result of a dynamic, multicomponent process.
Moreover, even though they may not have common views about
what those components are or their relative importance, they all
emphasize the connection between inner and outer states. In other
words, these models disagree about which specific internal and
external features are contained within the authenticity construct,
whereas they agree that the connection between these features
is critical. We concluded from this literature that authenticity, as
a complicated, multi-component, temporal, and highly contextual-
ized process, is unlikely to be captured in cross-sectional question-
naire data. However, the connection between the way people feel
on the inside and how they behave on the outside, independent
of the internal or external components themselves, represents a
core aspect of authenticity. The premise of this paper is that isolat-
ing this aspect would be a valuable step toward a more empirically
tenable model of authenticity that is faithful to classical theories of
authenticity.
1.5. Summary
Based on our literature review, we define being real as behaving
on the outside the way one feels on the inside, without regard for per-
sonal or social consequences. It is distinguishable from other fea-
tures of authenticity and other personality variables by several
properties.
 First, authenticity is a complex construct with internal/psy-
chological and external/behavioral dimensions (Fig. 1). Inter-
nal aspects include psychological functions that support
authentic behavior, such as self-awareness, accuracy of social
perception, and capacity for reflection. External behavior
includes all of the verbal and non-verbal expressions that
communicate variation in authenticity to others in social sit-
uations. Realness is the connection between these internal
and external dimensions. When people act the way they think
and feel (whether those internal states are positive or nega-
tive, conflictual or straightforward, socially acceptable or
not), they are being real.
 Second, realness is a product of psychological maturation, and
thus should be positively associated with indicators of well-
being, mental health, and mutually satisfying relationships. This
is particularly the case among people who have relatively devel-
oped internal functions as depicted in Fig. 1.
 Third, however, realness may involve violating social norms,
and thus it can come with both upsides and downsides for self
and others. In particular, realness reflects prioritizing being
genuine over social harmony, and thus should not be posi-
tively associated with traits related to the personality domain
agreeableness. On the other hand, one can also be fake by act-
ing less agreeably than they actually feel, and many people
appreciate realness in others. For these reasons, we would
not expect realness to be negatively associated with agreeable-
ness, either.
 Fourth, to the degree that realness can be used to describe peo-
ple, in general, realness scores should be relatively stable over
time, albeit subject to the influence of situational and develop-
mental factors (similar to personality traits; see Bleidorn &
Schwaba, 2017).
 Fifth, given that it manifests in social contexts (Chen, 2019),
realness should be observable by others, meaning that other
people should be able to reliably rank people they know in
terms of their tendency to be real.
Fig. 1. Realness as the Core of Authenticity.
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 Sixth, individual differences in realness should predict behavior
in situations when there are plausible negative consequences
for being real, because realness is not simply being disagreeable
and simply upsetting people, nor is it being honest when it is to
one’s advantage, it is a pattern of behavior that proves itself by
being, at times, socially disadvantageous.
1.6. Realness within empirical research on authenticity
Given its theoretical importance for social behavior, it is not
surprising that there has been both longstanding interest in
authenticity among personality and social psychologists and a
recent swell of research on the subject (Kovács, 2019; Hicks
et al., 2019; Hutchinson, 1995). We review that work in this sec-
tion in terms of the properties summarized above, to examine
the degree to which realness as we conceptualize it is represented
therein.
Existing authenticity measures can be categorized into two
types: those that measure a general disposition to be authentic
(Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Knoll et al., 2015; Wood et al., 2008)
and those that measure the tendency to be authentic in particular
roles or relationships (Brunell et al., 2010; Fleeson & Wilt, 2010;
Gelso, 2002; Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, & Ilardi; 1997). When
these measures have multiple dimensions, their scales generally
distinguish between more internal and more external features of
the construct, as reflected in Fig. 1. As discussed above, these com-
ponents are thought to interact in a dynamic, temporal process.
Although models differ with regard to specifics, the general idea
is that the person becomes aware of some inner goal, sense, or
experience then acts upon that awareness in a manner that is more
or less true to the inner goal, sense or experience.
We have two concerns about using these kinds of tools to
approximate this sort of process. First, we question the centrality
of internal and external features, in isolation, to the concept of
authenticity. Internal features, such as having some level of aware-
ness of internal states, being able to accurately perceive external
contexts, reflection, and self-regulation undergird a wide variety
of adaptive psychological functions. One of these functions may
be a tendency toward authentic behavior, but authenticity is nei-
ther a unique nor a necessary outcome of these healthy internal
processes. For instance, we would expect relationship success,
well-being, and lower risk for psychopathology to also follow from
these capacities. Although external behavior is a critical indicator
of authenticity, it also is not sufficient without reference to internal
states. We thus focus on the connection between inner states and
outer behavior, as discussed above.
Second, we are skeptical that it is possible to decompose a com-
plex dynamic within-person process using measures that assess
relatively stable attributes designed to make between-person dis-
tinctions at one point in time. It is perhaps telling that, in contrast
to the multidimensional questionnaires that are typical in cross-
sectional authenticity research, studies focused on the experience
of authenticity in particular moments (e.g., Fleeson & Wilt, 2010;
Lenton, Bruder, Slabu, & Sedikides, 2012; Sheldon, Gunz, &
Schachtman, 2012) or observations of others’ authenticity
(Gershon & Smith, 2019; Rosenblum et al., 2020) tend to gauge
authentic experience as a single construct that implicitly amalga-
mates inner goals, senses, experiences, awareness, and behavior.
That is, whereas research that does not attempt to capture tempo-
ral processes makes distinctions about internal and external
aspects of authenticity that are presumed to dynamically interact,
research that endeavors to study authenticity as a function of
situational context tends to collapse different components. Thus,
neither cross-sectional nor temporally sensitive research has fully
accounted for the processes theorized to account for authentic
personality and interaction styles in terms of both dynamic
processes and distinctions between awareness and behavior.
To be clear, we largely accept the thesis that different psycho-
logical components likely interact with one another in a variety
of complicated ways that ultimately give rise to what is regarded
as authentic patterns of behavior. However, our position is that
the research literature may have gotten ahead of itself by trying
to capture this entire process with multidimensional question-
naires, typically implemented in cross-sectional designs. We con-
cluded that it would be better to build up from robust, unitary
and foundational concepts to more complex, temporally nuanced
models. This would enable a foundational literature on the basic
parameters of this essentially authentic tendency. Moreover,
establishing the structure of different elements of authenticity
realness should support eventual work designed to unpack how
these elements unfold within dynamic and highly contextualized
social processes. As such, we focus on realness as the core dimen-
sion of authenticity. While we accept the general notion that
authenticity involves other constructs, we do not have a position
about the degree to which existing models accurately capture the
constructs involved. Instead, we focus on isolating realness as a
core and essential feature of authentic behavior.
Hypothesis 1. Realness content will be present in existing authenticity
measures
Given that we see realness as a core distinguishing feature of
authenticity, we should expect to find realness item content within
existing authenticity measures, albeit perhaps obscured and in
need of adaptation to clearly demarcate the tendency to act on
the outside the way one feels on the inside, without regard for per-
sonal or social consequences.
Hypothesis 2. Indicators exclusively focused on realness will form a
unidimensional trait
1.7. Correlates of authenticity
Although realness should be reflected in thoughts, feelings,
desires/goals, and behaviors, this core should cohere as a single,
homogeneous construct. Realness can manifest through the con-
gruence between inner emotions and outer affects, the trans-
parency of one’s motives, the sharing of perceptions and
attributions, or directly through behavior as perceived by others.
It is thus important that a robust model of realness include content
related to each of these psychological functions. That being said,
distinguishing these functions as separate factors was not our goal.
Rather, our focus was on what they have in common.
Hypothesis 3. Realness should generally correlate with measures of
well-being and adaptive functioning.
Authenticity measures have a broad array of adaptive correlates
(Hicks et al., 2019), including healthy personality traits such as
high extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness,
low neuroticism (Fleeson & Wilt, 2010; Grégoire, Baron, Ménard, &
Lachance, 2014; Pinto et al., 2012; Sheldon et al., 1997; Wood et al.,
2008), well-being/self-esteem (Davis, Hicks, Schlegel, Smith &
Vess, 2015; Grandey, Foo, Groth, & Goodwin, 2012; Heppner
et al., 2008; Kifer, Heller, Perunovic, & Galinsky, 2013; Knoll
et al., 2015; Lenton et al., 2012; 2016; Ménard & Brunet, 2011;
Rivera et al., 2019; Sheldon et al., 1997; Thomaes et al., 2017;
Wood et al., 2008), enhanced metacognition (Chiaburu, Cho, &
Gardner, 2015), greater autonomy (Hodgins & Knee, 2002), and
reduced stress/distress (Goldman & Kernis, 2002; Grégoire et al.,
2014; Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Satici & Kayis, 2013; Sheldon
et al., 1997; Theran, 2011; Wood et al., 2008). Others are more
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interpersonal, such as being liked (Hodgins, Koestner, & Duncan,
1996), receiving social support (Harter et al., 1996; Ryan & Solky,
1996), attachment security (Gillath et al., 2010; Gouveia, Schulz,
& Costa, 2016), developmental experiences with caregivers
(Lynch & Sheldon, 2017; Robinson, Lopez, & Ramos, 2014; Theran
& Han, 2013), honesty (Maltby et al., 2012), and healthy romantic
relationships (Brunell et al., 2010).
Research also suggests positive consequences over the longer
term. From the perspective of SDT, authentic behaviors help to sat-
isfy one’s basic needs (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000).
Work by Sheldon and colleagues verifies that working towards
more authentic goals is associated with well-being and goal attain-
ment (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001;
Sheldon et al., 1997), and a study by White and Tracey (2011) sug-
gests that authenticity is related to confidence in career choices.
Psychotherapy research connects patient ratings of their sense that
the therapist is being genuine with treatment outcomes (Eugster &
Wampold, 1996; Gelso, 2009; Marmarosh et al., 2009) perhaps in
part because therapist self-disclosure helps clients see their thera-
pists as more human (Knox et al., 1997). Overall, existing research
leaves little doubt that authenticity is a net positive characteristic
for well-being, social functioning, and adaptation. Given this pat-
tern of authenticity correlates, the fact that we hypothesize that
realness is a core feature of authenticity, and theoretical work
positing realness as an outcome of healthy development, we
expect realness to be generally adaptive as well.
Hypothesis 4. Realness should not be related to agreeableness traits.
1.8. Stability
That being said, it is also intuitive that most people think that it
is better to be authentic than otherwise, and empirical correlates of
various authenticity measures bear this out (Sedikides &
Skowronski, 1997). Who would want to be seen, or to see them-
selves, as inauthentic (Jongman-Sereno & Leary, 2016; Lenton
et al., 2012; 2013)? Cross-cultural research suggests that authen-
ticity is a relatively universal value (Slabu, Lenton, Sedikides, &
Bruder, 2014). Like many positively-valenced variables, there is a
risk for participants to see authenticity as an entirely positive attri-
bute, as would be suggested by trait correlations that are all in the
more adaptive direction (Leising et al., 2020). For instance,
Jongman-Sereno and Leary (2016) showed in two studies that peo-
ple view their positive actions as being more authentic than their
negative actions, even when the objective authenticity of their
behavior was controlled.
Critically, these correlations contrast with some of the nuance
in influential theories of authentic personality reviewed above
(e.g., Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1961), suggesting that contemporary
research may be missing something important (Baumeister,
2019). Specifically, in contrast to nearly universal positive correla-
tions between authenticity measures and adaptive outcomes in
empirical research, there is good reason to believe that there
should be downsides, at least occasionally, to authentic behavior.
In particular, early theorists would not support a definition of
authenticity as being particularly agreeable, because there are
times when being true to one’s self risks disappointing, annoying,
or frustrating others. Yet, Pinto et al. (2012) found that agreeable-
ness was correlated between 0.23 and 0.49 with authenticity
scales; these results included authenticity scales explicitly
designed to measure more external or behavioral features. In our
conception, realness should be reliably related to traits involving
psychological adjustment (high conscientiousness and low neu-
roticism) and sociability (i.e., high extraversion and openness),
but not to those related to a desire for social harmony and polite-
ness vs. rudeness and antagonism (i.e., agreeableness). We note
that this does not necessarily mean that observers will not see
others’ authenticity as warm or agreeable. Indeed, based on past
research using informant-report methods, we would expect obser-
vers to prefer their friends to be real rather than artificially polite
or superficially agreeable (e.g., Kovács, 2019; Liu & Perrewe, 2006).
Hypothesis 5. Individual differences in realness should be rank-order
and mean-level stable across time at levels similar to personality
traits.
1.9. Observability
Research suggests that authenticity measures achieve rank-
order and mean-level stabilities that are in the range of what
would be expected of individual difference constructs such as per-
sonality traits (Boyraz, Waits, & Felix, 2014; Reinecke & Trepte,
2014; Zhang, Zhou, Dik, & You, 2019). There is also evidence that
people are more authentic in certain kinds of relationships
(Robinson et al., 2018) and situations (Fleeson & Wilt, 2010;
Lenton, Bruder, Slabu, & Sedikides, 2012; Sheldon, Gunz, &
Schachtman, 2012) and that it increases with effective psychother-
apy (Bayliss-Conway et al., 2020). Sheldon et al. (1997) found that
the consistency of traits across different social roles and the degree
of authenticity in these roles independently predicted overall well-
being, suggesting that consistency in authentic behavior across
situations may, itself, indicate an important characteristic of
authenticity. Indeed, some authors have operationalized authen-
ticity in terms of consistency across situations (Sutton, 2018).
This pattern of sensitivity to situational factors that is similar
across individuals also accord with findings about personality
traits (Fleeson, 2001). The overall pattern fits with the model
shown in Fig. 1: realness, like other aspects of authenticity and per-
sonality traits more generally (Bleidorn et al., 2020), is a stable
individual difference that is also responsive to situational and con-
textual factors. We thus expected individual differences in realness
to be relatively stable across time, in terms of both rankings
between people (r > 0.50) and absolute group changes (approach-
ing 0) in the absence of external pressures.
Hypothesis 6. Individual differences in realness should be observable in
social situations.
1.10. Predicting situations
Given that authentic behavior occurs in a social context, real-
ness should be observable by others, and observers should be able
to reliably rank people as more or less real relative to one another.
Several studies have demonstrated that observers can reliably code
the authenticity in other peoples’ behavior. For instance, Anderson
et al. (2020) had people describe their emotional responses to a
film clip they had just watched, and their descriptions were coded
by three people using a single 7-point item ranging from genuine
to not genuine. These codes were reliably related to one another
(alpha = 0.67 and 0.74 in two studies). Gershon and Smith (2020)
had participants rate entrepreneurs, politicians, tour guides, and
comedians whose vignettes they read using three items asking
about authenticity, sincerity, and genuineness (adapted from
Barasch et al., 2014). The alphas for these items tended to be
around 0.91 across several studies. Importantly, these authors also
found that it was important to give observers access to multiple
instances of targets’ authentic behavior, because people actually
rated targets as less authentic the more the targets repeated them-
selves. Rosenblum et al. (2019) found that observers reliably rated
politicians who use politically incorrect language as more authen-
tic (using adapted items from Wood et al., 2008 scale having to do
with ease of being influenced) but also less warm. This finding is
consistent with our view of realness in suggesting that assess-
ments that focus more explicitly on observable behavior in a
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context with potential costs may reduce associations between
authenticity and traits related to agreeableness.
Hypothesis 7. Individual differences in realness should predict
behavior in situations where there are potential downsides to being
real
It is established that the state experiences of traits are reliably
related to stable trait ratings (Fleeson, 2001), and a reliable corre-
lation has been observed between ratings of trait authenticity and
the frequency of experiencing authentic states (Lenton et al., 2012;
Lenton, Slabu, & Sedikides, 2016). We note that a separate litera-
ture has to do with the fact that the felt experience of authenticity
is more related to aspects of situations than consistency between
one’s behavior and one’s self-rated personality traits (Fleeson &
Wilt, 2010). This idea, while important for thinking about how
authenticity manifests as a contextualized social process, is inde-
pendent of our interest in identifying a marker of stable individual
differences in realness. Taken together, existing research suggests
that assessments of stable tendencies predict the likelihood of
authentic behavior in specific social situations, on average. How-
ever, as noted above, realness can only be tested in situations in
which there are potential personal or social downsides. When
one’s inner sensibilities and external pressures align, the same
behavior can serve both goals. Thus, we should expect the finding
that trait authenticity predicts situational behavior to extend to a
more specific assessments of realness in situations with potential
personal or social costs.
1.11. Overview of studies
We tested these hypotheses through a progression of nine stud-
ies (Table 1). In the first, we examined the subscales of three
widely used multidimensional authenticity measures, and found
that these scales had very similar and uniformly adaptive patterns
of correlation with external variables, including agreeableness. We
generated an item list with common instructions and response
anchors to isolate content specifically reflective of realness as man-
ifest in thoughts, feelings, motives, and behaviors. In the second
study, we administered self and informant report versions of these
items along with a number of criterion measures in order to select
the best functioning indicators. We termed the resulting 12-item
measure the Realness Scale (RS). In the third study, we confirmed
the unidimensional structure of the RS and examined its correla-
tions with other authenticity measures. In the fourth and fifth
studies, we examined correlations between the RS and personality
traits in large undergraduate and community samples, with partic-
ular attention to associations with agreeableness. In the sixth
study, we used a peer nomination sampling strategy to dissociate
realness from likability or positive valence. In the seventh study,
we evaluated the retest and mean-level stability of the realness
scale across five months. In the eighth study, we applied the RS
as an observational measure to code speed-dating interactions, in
order to evaluate the inter-rater reliability of observed ratings of
realness. In the ninth study, we translated the RS to German and
examined its validity for predicting actual behavior in a variety
of hypothetical situations, as well as perceived impacts of realness
for self and others. Statistical significance was set at p < .01 for all
statistical tests, and interpretation largely focused on effect sizes.
No study was preregistered. All studies were approved by local
IRB boards and all data are available at https://osf.io/3kqpw/?
view_only=2c91999e89c5457a9b5817fc8efc615d.
2. Study 1
The goal of the first study was to identify realness within the
content of popular authenticity measures, and to establish associ-
ations between these measures with a variety of criterion vari-
ables. We administered three commonly used measures to 983
undergraduates (mean age = 19.46, SD = 2.07; 776 female/207
male; 713 white, 79 black, 138 Asian/Pacific Islander, 51 multira-
cial, 2 other; 41 Hispanic/941 non-Hispanic/1 unreported) and
examined the intercorrelations and external correlates of their
scales.
2.1. Measures
The Authenticity Inventory, Version 3 (AI; Goldman & Kernis,
2004) is a 45-itemmeasure of authentic personality style with four
dimensions (Kernis & Goldman, 2006): awareness (Cronbach’s
a = 0.77), unbiased processing (a = 0.66), behavior (a = 0.73), and
close relationships (a = 0.76). The Real Relationship Inventory (RRI;
Gelso et al., 2005; Kelly et al., 2010) is a 24-item questionnaire
designed to measure two characteristics of a real relationship rel-
evant for psychotherapy (but applicable to any relationship), real-
ism (having realistic appraisals of self and other, a = 0.92) and
genuineness (a = 0.91). The Authenticity in Relationships Scale
(AIRS; Lopez & Rice, 2006) is a 37-item questionnaire designed to
measure two relational authenticity factors (Gouvea et al., 2013):
unacceptability of deception (a = 0.89) and intimate risk taking
(a = 0.89). Both the RRI and AIRS instruct respondents to rate their
behavior in a specific relationship. We asked people to respond to
RRI and AIRS items in terms of their relationships with friends.
We administered a variety of criterion measures of adaptive and
maladaptive personality. We generally expected authenticity
scales to correlate positively with adaptive personality traits. The
Five Factor Model Rating Form (FFMRF; Mullins-Sweatt et al.,
2006) is a 30-item measure of the five-factor model of personality
with one item for each facet of the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae,
1992). We used the FFMRF to measure five personality domains:
neuroticism (a = 0.68), extraversion (a = 0.71), openness to experi-
ence (a = 0.71), agreeableness (a = 0.69), and conscientiousness
(a = 0.80). The Inventory of Interpersonal Problems-Short Circumplex
(IIP-SC; Hopwood et al., 2008; Soldz et al., 1995) is a 32-item mea-
sure of interpersonal dysfunction. The circumplex octant scales
(Mdn. a = 0.76) can be summarized with three factors: overall
Table 1
Studies and Hypotheses.
Study Hypothesis Specific Study Goal
1 1 Examine the correlates of existing authenticity
measures
2 2/3/4 Create a unidimensional realness scale (RS), examine
initial correlates
3 2/3/4 Confirm structure of realness and examine correlates
with existing authenticity measures
4 3/4 Examine correlates between realness and personality
variables
5 3/4 Replicate correlates between realness and personality
variables
6 3/4 Use peer nomination strategy to disentangle realness
ratings from positive valence effects
7 5 Examine 4-month retest reliability of realness
8 6 Examine reliability of observer ratings of realness
among participants in a speed dating task
9 7 Translate the RS to German, examine validity of
realness for predicting situational behavior, extend
correlates
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interpersonal distress, problems related to dominance vs. submis-
siveness, and problems related to warmth vs. coldness (Gurtman &
Pincus, 2003). The Interpersonal Sensitivities Circumplex (ISC;
Hopwood et al., 2011) is a 64-item measure of behaviors that the
respondent finds irritating in others. Like the IIP-SC, the circumplex
octant scales (Mdn. a = 0.80) of the ISC can be summarized with
three factors: overall interpersonal sensitivity, being annoyed by
dominance vs. submissiveness, and being annoyed by warmth vs.
coldness. The Hyperbolic Temperament Questionnaire (HTQ;
Hopwood, Thomas, & Zanarini, 2012; a = 0.91) is an 11-item mea-
sure of borderline personality features based on Zanarini’s theory
of hyperbolic temperament (Zanarini & Frankenburg, 2007). We
administered three scales from the Personality Diagnostic
Questionnaire-4+ (PDQ-4+; Hyler, 1994), a measure of DSM-4-TR
(APA, 2000) personality disorder categories. We specifically mea-
sured dependent (a = 0.64), narcissistic (a = 0.59), and obsessive–
compulsive (a = 0.42) disorders. The Personal Health Questionnaire
(PHQ; Rizzo et al., 2000; a = 0.86) is a 9-item measure of depres-
sion with items that correspond directly to the DSM-4-TR symp-
tom criteria. The Internality Scale of Locus of Control (LOC;
Levenson, 1981; a = 0.59) is an say 8-item measure of internal vs.
external locus of control. The Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS;
Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994; a = 0.85) is a 20-item measure of
alexithymia, or difficulties with emotional awareness. The
Experiences in Close Relationships Scale (ECR; Fraley et al., 2011) is
a 36-item measure of anxious (a = 0.94) and avoidant (a = 0.95)
attachment styles.
2.2. Results and discussion
The top section of Table 2 shows that the intercorrelations
among the various authenticity scales tended to be high, particu-
larly for the two RRI scales (r = 0.92). However, there was some
variation in these correlations, pointing to a distinction between
more internal and external aspects of authentic behavior. For
instance, the unbiased processing scale had relatively weak corre-
lations with scales explicitly focused on external behavior such as
AIRS intimate risk taking (r = 0.17).
The middle section of Table 2 shows that these scales also had a
highly similar pattern of association with external variables, lar-
gely indicative of psychological health and well-being. Specifically,
authenticity scales tended to have positive correlations with
extraversion, openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and
internal locus of control and negative correlations with neuroti-
cism, interpersonal problems, sensitivity to others’ warmth, bor-
derline, dependent, and narcissistic personality, depression,
alexithymia, and attachment avoidance and anxiety. We computed
Pearson congruence coefficients1 to examine the similarity of these
correlation patterns. These values, shown in the bottom section of
Table 2, ranged from 0.77 to 1.00, with the majority > 0.90. Overall,
these values suggest that, despite their different conceptual inter-
pretations, each authenticity scale across these three multidimen-
sional instruments has a very similar pattern of external correlates.
Overall, these results indicate that authenticity is generally adaptive
and each instrument is tapping a very similar construct, although
there may be some subtle distinctions between more internal and
more external aspects.
This pattern is somewhat consistent with what we would hope
for from a measure of realness, but there were also notable diver-
gences. The fact that all authenticity scales are highly intercorre-
lated suggests that the construct coheres at a broad level, as we
would expect.
Validity correlations suggest that authenticity is a generally
adaptive construct, and in fact it is strongly related with a number
of indicators of mental health. However, the tendency to be agree-
able and sensitive to others’ coldness was among the strongest cor-
relates of existing authenticity scales. As discussed above, these
results do not align with our concept of realness, which is rooted
in theories of authentic personality and behavior that have consis-
tently prioritized genuineness over social grace, politeness, or
impression management. Overall, these results were consistent
with our hypothesis that the core of authenticity lies in the connec-
tion between its more internal and external features, but that this
core is masked in existing measures by positive valence, efforts to
assess internal and external dimensions as distinct from one
another, and the influence of peripheral factors.
3. Study 2
Although these issues are difficult to disentangle at the level of
existing subscales, we observed that some specific items seemed to
reflect our concept of realness whereas others did not. The purpose
of Study 2 was to isolate realness content within existing authen-
ticity measures in order to generate a reliable, unidimensional
measurement tool. We focused on two specific features of items
within existing measures. First, items should reflect external
behaviors that align with internal states. For instance, they should
reference being transparent, open, and straightforward in social
situations. In contrast, they should not solely reference internal
or external states (e.g., self-awareness). We especially preferred
items that specified the situations in which realness would be
observed – that is, when there were potential costs to being real.
This was based on our conceptualization that realness involves
being authentic even when there are downsides.
Second, because we were interested in realness as a generalized
individual difference that would be relatively stable across situa-
tions and relationships, items should refer to a general trait rather
than a specific behavior or certain relationships. We had two rea-
sons for this choice. First, although it is widely understood that
authenticity is more likely and, arguably, appropriate in some
kinds of relationships than others, we defined realness as a stable
trait whose between-person rank order would generally pertain
across situations with different presses for being real. Second, we
sought to develop a general measure that could be used for a vari-
ety of purposes in the pursuit of understanding realness, rather
than a measure that would be useful only for studying certain
kinds of relationships.
Three of the authors independently identified items that best
reflected these features on the AIRS, RRI, AI, and Wood et al.
(2008) Authenticity Scale items. Of the 118 total items on these
four instruments, we found 42 non-redundant items reflecting
our notion of realness. However, these were not balanced with
regard to thoughts, feelings, behaviors, and motives/desires, nor
in terms of item keying. Thus, we wrote 38 additional items (all
80 items are available at https://osf.io/7vdgp/?view_only = 2
c91999e89c5457a9b5817fc8efc615d). We harmonized all items
with a 4-point scale (False, Somewhat False, Somewhat True, True)
and reworded items to reflect a general disposition rather than
specific relationships as necessary. We then collected data with
the goal of trimming these 80 items in order to construct a unidi-
mensional realness scale that we could use to examine self-
informant agreement and correlates.
3.1. Methods
Participants were 1033 undergraduates (mean age = 19.77,
SD = 2.02; 749 female, 282 male, 2 other; 702 white, 70 black,
1 We used Pearson coefficients rather than Tucker coefficients because we were
interested in specifically in the pattern of correlations; we were not interested in
evaluating the relative magnitude and shape of those correlations for each scale.
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154 Asian/Pacific Islander, 1 Native American, 31 multiracial, 31
Hispanic, and 42 other). Of these, 368 had a participant-
nominated informant (informants’ mean age = 2.17, SD = 4.52;
271 female, 97 male; 275 white, 24 black, 35 Asian, 3 Native Amer-
ican, 20 Hispanic, 11 other).
In addition to the 80 candidate realness items, participants also
completed the following criterion measures. The Five-Factor Model
Rating Form (Mullins-Sweatt et al., 2006) is a 30-item measure of
the personality traits neuroticism (a = 0.75), extraversion
(a = 0.70), openness (a = 0.63), agreeableness (a = 0.68), and con-
scientiousness (a = 0.80). They were also administered the honesty
scale from the HEXACO-60 (Ashton & Lee, 2009, a = 0.73) and scales
from the Computer Adaptive Test of Personality Disorders (Simms
et al., 2011) measuring emotional detachment (7 items a = 0.85),
manipulativeness (6 items a = 0.89), and submissiveness (6 items
a = 0.89). The IIP-SCwas used, as in study 1, to assess interpersonal
problems and its octant scales (Mdn. a = 0.76) were summarized in
terms of overall interpersonal distress, problems related to domi-
nance vs. submissiveness, and problems related to warmth vs.
coldness. Finally, the Self-Monitoring Scale was administered
(a = 0.60). We expected realness to correlate negatively with
self-monitoring. Informants completed the 80 realness items with
reference to the target (participant), as well as the FFMRF
Table 2
Authenticity subscale intercorrelations and validity correlations.
Authenticity Inventory Real Relationships
Inventory












Relationship orientation 0.65 0.30 0.60
Genuine 0.53 0.23 0.44 0.63
Realism 0.53 0.25 0.45 0.62 0.92
Intimate Risk-Taking 0.40 0.17 0.38 0.53 0.70 0.63
Unacceptability of
Deception
0.42 0.35 0.51 0.52 0.65 0.64 0.56
Validity Correlations
Neuroticism -0.32 -0.32 -0.36 -0.17 -0.17 -0.20 -0.09 -0.14
Extraversion 0.33 0.18 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.28
Openness 0.25 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.25
Agreeableness 0.29 0.13 0.20 0.38 0.36 0.36 0.27 0.27
Conscientiousness 0.42 0.19 0.30 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.20 0.28
Interpersonal Problems -0.31 -0.37 -0.41 -0.21 -0.24 -0.24 -0.22 -0.23
Dominance 0.04 0.03 0.12 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.11 0.01
Warmth 0.10 -0.04 0.00 0.26 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.05
Interpersonal
Sensitivities
0.03 -0.22 -0.08 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.01
Sensitivity to Dominance 0.11 -0.06 -0.03 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.10 0.12
Sensitivity to Warmth -0.19 -0.03 -0.12 -0.38 -0.29 -0.27 -0.29 -0.26
Borderline -0.27 -0.36 -0.35 -0.08 -0.14 -0.18 -0.07 -0.17
Dependent -0.41 -0.39 -0.50 -0.28 -0.30 -0.33 -0.33 -0.21
Narcissistic -0.17 -0.23 -0.22 -0.23 -0.22 -0.23 -0.23 -0.14
Obsessive-Compulsive -0.05 -0.21 -0.13 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03
Depression -0.31 -0.32 -0.35 -0.21 -0.17 -0.20 -0.19 -0.06
Internal Locus of Control 0.21 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.13
Alexithymia -0.61 -0.51 -0.55 -0.50 -0.43 -0.44 -0.32 -0.38
Attachment Anxiety -0.33 -0.40 -0.40 -0.23 -0.22 -0.24 -0.24 -0.12




Relationship orientation 0.94 0.77 0.87
Genuine 0.96 0.83 0.91 0.98
Realism 0.97 0.85 0.92 0.98 1.00
Intimate Risk-Taking 0.94 0.83 0.91 0.96 0.97 0.96
Unacceptability of
Deception
0.95 0.84 0.91 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.94
Note. p-values and CIs are not given for ease of presentation.
Table 3





At times I say what people want to hear rather
than what I want. r
0.47 0.56 0.31
I do what works best for the situation even if
it is not how I feel. r
0.31 0.37 0.17
Others might see me as fake. r 0.34 0.37 0.08
It would take a lot for me to tell someone they
have hurt me. r
0.45 0.30 0.37
I tell the truth even if it makes others
unhappy.
0.44 – 0.65
I say what I believe even if people don’t like it. 0.56 – 0.68
I sometimes act like I believe what others
believe. r
0.44 0.49 0.26
I tend to tell others exactly what I think even
if it causes conflict.
0.50 – 0.74
I avoid sharing desires that others may not
approve of. r
0.47 0.41 0.33
I express my needs and desires directly. 0.57 – 0.56
I share my feelings with others even if it
upsets them.
0.51 – 0.78
I tell people what I want even if they may not
want the same thing.
0.51 – 0.66
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(neuroticism a = 0.75, extraversion a = 0.69, openness a = 0.57,
agreeableness a = 0.73, conscientiousness a = 0.85).
Items were selected based on a consideration of several criteria
(Holden & Fekken, 1990). First, we preferred items with a relatively
low reading level. Second, we sought to balance reverse- and
positively-keyed items, to minimize the potential impacts of
response style (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). For negatively-
keyed items, we focused on not being real to avoid some personal
or social cost. Third, we selected items with strong part-whole cor-
relations, to be sure we were targeting items at the core of the real-
ness construct. Fourth, we sought balance in item content in terms
of sharing thoughts, sharing feelings, sharing desires, and showing
authenticity in behavior.
3.2. Results and discussion
Based on a consideration of each of these factors, we ultimately
selected the 12 items in Table 3 for the Realness Scale (RS). These
items are balanced in terms item keying and content (i.e., three
items explicitly refer to thoughts and feelings each, four to motives
or desires, and two to behaviors). Eight of the items explicitly ref-
erence a potential social tradeoff of being real. The Flesch-Kincaid
reading level for all items was 7th grade or lower with a median of
4.5 and part-whole correlations (with reference to all 80 initial
items) were all above 0.3. The alpha was 0.81 and the item mean
was 2.78 (SD = 0.56). We fit these items to a factor model with
diagonally weighted least squares (WLSMV) estimation to deal
with categorical indicators using Mplus version 8 (Muthén &
Muthén, 1998–2017). A model with one substantive factor and
one method factor where the reverse keyed items were freed
showed adequate fit to the data (X2(48) = 153.79, RMSEA = 0.05,
CFI = 0.96, TLI = 0.95, SRMR = 0.03). Although one item (‘‘others
might see me as fake”) had a relatively small contribution to the gen-
eral factor, we retained it to enhance content validity. Specifically,
this is one of the two items asking about other peoples’ impressions
of the respondent’s behavior.
The informant version of the RS had an alpha of 0.83 (M = 3.03,
SD = 0.53). The self-informant correlation for the RS was 0.16
(p = .002; 95% CI = 0.06 - 0.26), lower than we had expected. Table 4
displays correlations between realness, as rated by both self and
informant, and big five traits, as rated by both self and informant.
Self-reported realness correlated positively with self-reported
extraversion and conscientiousness, negatively with neuroticism,
and was uncorrelated with agreeableness and openness.
Informant-informant correlations mirrored this result, but with
somewhat stronger correlations with openness and agreeableness.
The only significant correlation between informant-reported real-
ness and self-reported traits was for high extraversion. No correla-
tions between self-reported realness and informant-reported traits
were significant, although there was a potentially meaningful neg-
ative correlation between self-reported realness and informant-
reported agreeableness.
Overall, these results suggest that, although agreement
between self and informants is relatively low, similarity in the
nomological networks of realness as assessed by self and informant
was relatively high. The RS is generally associated with adaptive
personality features. However, whereas by self-report people
who see themselves as real do not also see themselves as agreeable
and are not seen by others as agreeable, informants who rated tar-
gets as more real also perceived them to be more agreeable. This
may suggest that realness is an attribute that is appreciated or
experienced as agreeable or warm by others, even if it is not actu-
ally a particularly agreeable or polite pattern of behavior. We
explore this issue further in Study 6 below.
We next examined correlations of self- and informant-rated
realness with the measures that were only administered by self-
report (Table 5). As expected, realness was correlated positively
albeit modestly with honesty and interpersonal dominance and
negatively with emotional detachment, manipulativeness, submis-
siveness, interpersonal problems, and self-monitoring. Notably, it
was uncorrelated with warmth. Informant-rated realness had
fewer significant correlations, likely due to method effects and
lower power due to the smaller sample. Unlike self-reported real-
ness and mirroring the effects for big five variables, it was posi-
tively correlated with warmth. It was also negatively correlated
with emotional detachment and manipulativeness.
To summarize, in this study we were able to identify 12 realness
items that formed a unidimensional scale, were balanced in keying,
and covered a range of content involving being real with others
about thoughts, feelings, desires, and behavior. Correlates between
this scale and self-reported criteria were as predicted. However,
self-other agreement was comparatively low, perhaps because par-
ticipants and informants seemed to understand realness somewhat
differently. Both self- and informant-reports associated realness
with healthier emotional and interpersonal functioning. However,
individuals considering their own behavior associated realness
with assertive dominance, whereas individuals considering a tar-
get’s behavior associated realness with warm agreeableness.
4. Study 3
The goal of Study 3 was to confirm the unidimensional structure
of the RS and examine associations with existing authenticity mea-
sures, in order to confirm that the scale captured an essential fea-
ture of this complex construct. We administered the RS and five
authenticity measures to 504 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers
(mean age = 36, SD = 11.32; 255 female, 245 male, 4 other; 353
white, 35 black, 7 Asian/Pacific Islander, 41 Hispanic, 68 other)
who were paid $7/hr for participating in the Fall of 2016. Authen-
ticity measures included the three that were used in Study 1 (AIRS,
a = 0.95, RRI, a = 0.96 and AI, a = 0.94) as well as the Wood et al.
(2008) Authenticity Scale (a = 0.89) and three items adapted from
Fleeson and Wilt (2010, Study 2; a = 0.92). The mean score on the
RS items was 2.78 (SD = 0.56). Covariance among the items fit a
model with a method factor well (X2(48) = 138.87, RMSEA = 0.06
[CI = 0.05-0.07], CFI = 0.96, TLI = 0.95, SRMR = 0.04). Correlations
between the RS and established authenticity measures ranged from
r = 0.47 to 0.64 (Table 6), suggesting that the RS is strongly associ-
ated with existing authenticity measures, even though its content
is more specific to realness as we define it.
5. Study 4
The goal of Study 4 was to replicate the correlations of the RS
with self-reported personality traits observed in Study 2. Study 4
consisted of 1,025 undergraduates; 19 were removed for > 10%
missing data, leaving 1006. The mean age was 19.72 (2.19); 180
(17.60%) self-identified as male and 822 (8.2%) as female, and 4
(0.40%) as other; 252 (24.6%) were Hispanic and 754 (73.6%) were
not Hispanic; there were 328 (32%) white, 22 (2.1%) black, 485
(47.3%) Asian, 27 (2.7%) Native American, 94 (9.2%) multiracial,
47 (4.6%) Latin American, and 3 (0.3%) other races reported. The
coefficient alpha for the RS was 0.79, and alphas for the IPIP-50
(Goldberg, 1999) measure of big five traits were 0.85 for neuroti-
cism, 0.88 for extraversion, 0.80 for openness, 0.81 for agreeable-
ness, and 0.80 for conscientiousness. As expected, realness was
negatively correlated with neuroticism and positively correlated
with extraversion, openness, and conscientiousness (Table 7).
These results provided initial confirmation that realness has gener-
ally adaptive personality correlates, but is unrelated to
agreeableness.
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6. Study 5
The purpose of Study 5 was to replicate these results in a com-
munity sample. Participants were 1004 Mturk workers from the
United States who were paid $7/hr for participating in the summer
of 2018. The average age was 36.46 (SD = 1.99); 532 (51.8%) were
male, 471 (45.9%) were female, 1 other; 111 (1.8%) were Hispanic
and 893 (87.0%) were not Hispanic; 780 (75.9%) were white, 113
(11%) black, 63 (6%) Asian, 10 (1%) Native American, 32 (3.1%) mul-
tiracial, and 6 (0.6%) other. The coefficient alpha for the RS was
0.86, and alphas for the IPIP-50 (Goldberg, 1999) measure of big
five traits were 0.92 for neuroticism, 0.91 for extraversion, 0.83
for openness, 0.88 for agreeableness, and 0.85 for
conscientiousness.
Results are given in Table 7. As in Study 4, realness was nega-
tively correlated with neuroticism and positively correlated with
extraversion, openness, and conscientiousness. Contrary to our
hypothesis, a modest but significant positive correlation was
observed with agreeableness. Overall, the results of Studies 3, 4,
and 5 largely confirm our expectation that the RS is a) positively
and strongly correlated with existing authenticity measures, b) like
other authenticity measures in having generally positive corre-
lates, but c) different from other authenticity measures in being
mostly unrelated to agreeableness. However, given the importance
of the agreeableness effect in particular, and the ambiguity in these
results (i.e., a significant agreeableness correlation in Study 5), we
next sought to pursue the association between realness and agree-
ableness in more detail. Specifically, we designed a study to disen-
tangle perceptions of a people who are equally likeable but differ in
realness.
7. Study 6
In Study 6, we used a peer nomination strategy to test whether
informant report correlations with agreeableness traits were due
to valence or selection effects, and to dissociate realness from lik-
ability or positive valence more generally. Specifically, we asked
people to select two friends, both of whom were equally likeable,
but one of whom was particularly real whereas the other was
not. We reasoned that this design would eliminate the positive
association between realness and agreeableness from informant-
reports (Table 4), and thus show that realness can come across as
relatively disagreeable when referenced against a more courteous
(but equally likeable) alternative.
Participants were 746 undergraduates in a public American uni-
versity who were compensated with course credit. The average age
was 19.81 (SD = 2.10); 625 were women, 117 men, and 4 reported
other genders; 372 were Asian/Asian-American, 165 White/
European-American, 12 were Black/African-American, 11 Pacific
Islander, 5 Native American, 68 multi-racial and 113 reported
Table 4
Self and informant correlations between realness and big five personality traits in Study 2.
Realness Self Informant
Big Five trait Self Informant Self Informant
r 95%CI p r 95%CI p r 95%CI p r 95%CI p
Neuroticism -0.26 [-0.43, -0.24] < 0.01 -0.08 [-0.18, 0.03] 0.13 -0.08 [-0.18, 0.03] 0.14 -0.29 [-0.38, -0.20] < 0.01
Extraversion 0.35 [0.32, 0.50] < 0.01 0.07 [-0.05, 0.17] 0.20 0.16 [0.05, 0.26] < 0.01 0.35 [0.25, 0.44] < 0.01
Openness 0.12 [0.01, 0.21] 0.03 -0.04 [-0.13, 0.05] 0.45 -0.02 [-0.12, 0.09] 0.68 0.21 [0.10, 0.32] < 0.01
Agreeableness 0.00 [-0.11, 0.11] 0.94 -0.13 [-0.24, -0.03] 0.01 0.08 [-0.04, 0.20] 0.13 0.23 [0.13, 0.33] < 0.01
Conscientiousness 0.17 [0.05, 0.28] <0.01 0.04 [-0.06, 0.14] 0.42 0.08 [-0.04, 0.18] 0.15 0.19 [0.09, 0.29] < 0.01
Table 5
Correlations between self-reported and informant-reported realness and self-reported criterion variables in Study 3.
Criterion Variable Self-Report Realness Informant-Report Realness
r 95% CI p r 95% CI p
Honesty 0.13 [0.02, 0.25] < 0.01 0.13 [0.03, 0.23] 0.01
Emotional Detachment -0.44 [-0.53, -0.35] < 0.01 -0.25 [-0.35, -0.16] < 0.01
Manipulativeness -0.27 [-0.36, -0.18] < 0.01 -0.15 [-0.26, -0.04] < 0.01
Submissiveness -0.52 [-0.59, -0.46] < 0.01 -0.07 [-0.17, 0.03] 0.21
Interpersonal Problems -0.50 [-0.57, -0.42] < 0.01 -0.07 [-0.18, 0.05] 0.16
Dominance 0.47 [0.39, 0.54] < 0.01 0.12 [0.03, 0.25] 0.01
Warmth -0.08 [-0.18, 0.04] 0.15 0.20 [0.11, 0.29] < 0.01
Self-Monitoring -0.26 [-0.36, -0.15] < 0.01 -0.05 [-0.15, 0.05] 0.32
Table 6
Correlations between realness and composite scores from five authenticity
inventories.
Authenticity Instrument Realness Scale 95% CI
Authenticity Inventory 0.64 [0.60 - 0.69]
Real Relationship Inventory 0.47 [0.40 - 0.53]
Authenticity in Relationships Scale 0.54 [0.47 - 0.61]
Authenticity Scale 0.60 [0.55 - 0.66]
Fleeson and Wilt items 0.49 [0.42 - 0.57]
Note. All p < .01.
Table 7
Realness correlations in Studies 4 and 5.
Trait Study 4 Study 5
r 95% CI p r 95% CI p
Neuroticism -0.29 [-0.22, -0.34] < 0.01 -0.35 [-0.29, -0.41] < 0.01
Extraversion 0.36 [0.30, 0.42] < 0.01 0.31 [0.24, 0.36] < 0.01
Openness 0.29 [0.23, 0.35] < 0.01 0.30 [0.23, 0.36] < 0.01
Agreeableness 0.06 [-0.01, 0.12] 0.07 0.18 [0.11, 0.25] < 0.01
Conscientiousness 0.25 [0.19, 0.31] < 0.01 0.28 [0.21, 0.35] < 0.01
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other races or did not report race; 179 participants identified as
having Hispanic ethnicity. Participants were given the following
instructions (order of second and third paragraph was
randomized):
‘‘Please think of two friends that can be described by each of the
following paragraphs. You should like these two friends about the
same, and feel about equally close to both of them.
The first friend is not that concerned about seeming rude, and
others see them as ‘real’, direct, straightforward, and even brutally
honest. They say what they want rather than what others want to
hear and tell others what they think even if it causes conflict. They
do what they feel or want whether or not others want or feel the
same thing, even it makes the situation awkward or uncomfort-
able. They tell the truth even if it makes others unhappy and are
not afraid to tell someone else if they feel hurt or disappointed.
This person would never act like they believed something others
believed if they did not feel it themselves.
The second friend is very concerned about seeming rude, and
others see them as polite, discreet, flexible, and possibly even ‘in-
authentic’. They say what they think others want to hear rather
than what they actually want in order to avoid conflict. If they
believe others want or feel something strongly, they may pretend
that they want or feel the same thing to keep the situation com-
fortable. They may not tell the whole truth if they fear it will make
others unhappy, and would avoid telling someone else they feel
hurt or disappointed. This person would be willing to act like they
believed something others believe to avoid an awkward situation.”
They were then asked to rate the personality characteristics of
each of these friends (order of friends was randomized) using the
IPIP-120 (Maples et al., 2014, median facet a = 0.75 for real friend
and a = 0.75 for polite friend), the Agentic and Communal Values
scale (Trapnell & Paulhus, 2012; alphas ranged from 0.78 to
0.94), and the Honesty scale from the brief HEXACO-60 (Ashton
& Lee, 2009; a = 0.78 for real friend and a = 0.81 for inauthentic
friend).
The profile correlation for mean personality facet scores across
the ‘‘real” and ‘‘inauthentic” friend was r = 0.22, suggesting rather
different profiles for these two vignettes. Participants rated the real
friend as substantially more extraverted, assertive, and agentic and
substantially less agreeable, communal, and cooperative (Table 8).
As with self-report correlations, peers rated their friend who is
more real as less neurotic, but in contrast to other findings, they
also rated that person as less conscientious. Interestingly, raters
actually perceived the inauthentic person as more ‘‘honest” based
on the HEXACO scale, highlighting both differences between a
self-report and peer-nomination approach to studying
authenticity-related constructs, and substantive differences
between realness and HEXACO honesty.
Overall, these results suggest that the informant-report correla-
tion between realness and agreeableness observed in Study 2 may
have been, at least in part, an artifact of the general halo effect
associated with informant-reported personality traits (Leising
et al., in press). That is, when asked to describe a friend, there is
a tendency for people who say positive things in one domain
(i.e., realness) to extend those positive descriptions to other
domains (i.e., agreeableness). However, when asked to distinguish
real and polite friends that are equally likeable, people tend to see
the real friend as relatively less agreeable. Self-report data tend to
be between these two effects in that the association between real-
ness and agreeableness is small or null. This finding supports our
contention that a critical element of being real involves the ability
to be disagreeable at times, and highlights the impact of different
approaches to asking people about this kind of behavior.
8. Study 7
The goal of Study 7 was to estimate the retest stability of real-
ness. We sampled 412 undergraduates (mean age = 20.35,
SD = 2.13; 81% women, 17% men, 2% other; 36% white, 34%
Asian/Asian-American, 3% black, 2% Native American/Pacific Islan-
der, 25% other). Of these, 301 completed the RS five months after
baseline. The retest correlation was 0.74, and the mean among
people who participated at both waves was 2.45 (SD = 0.53) at time
1 and 2.45 (SD = 0.52) at time 2 (d = 0.00). Overall, these data sup-
port the interpretation of realness as a stable individual difference
variable, with longitudinal consistency estimates similar to what
we would expect of personality traits.
9. Study 8
The goal of Study 8 was to test whether realness could be reli-
ably coded in actual behavior by observers. Part of the logic of this
study is that traits can be inferred from the observation of multiple
contextualized states (Lenton et al., 2013), and that observations of
individuals across multiple interactions produces more valid esti-
mates of realness than those from a single social situation
(Gershon & Smith, 2020). Thus, we had trained research assistants
observe targets across 12 interactions with different people, and
then use the RS scale items to estimate how real the person was
in their interactions, in general.
Specifically, eight research assistants (four women and four
men) coded interactions during 8 speed dating sessions with 24
people each, for a total of 192 targets (Eastwick et al., 2007;
Finkel & Eastwick, 2008). Each session was coded by 4 coders (2
men and 2 women), who watched all 12 interactions for a given
participant and then filled out the 12-item RS based on what they
think the person is like, in general. The overall alpha for the RS was
0.90, and the one-way random effects average ICC for the overall
realness score was 0.59 (95% CI = 0.48 - 0.68; individual
ICC = 0.26, 95% CI = 0.19 - 0.35), indicating statistically significant
(p < .001) agreement across observers about individual differences
in realness. We explored correlations between observer-rated real-
ness and a brief self-report measure of big 5 traits (Donnellan et al.,
2006; neuroticism a = 0.78, extraversion a = 0.84, openness
a = 0.65, agreeableness a = 0.75, conscientiousness a = 0.74). All
correlations were < |0.05| and none were statistically significant,
perhaps because of method effects.
10. Study 9
The goals of Study 9 were to translate the RS to German, evalu-
ate correlations with measures of personality and interpersonal
effectiveness, and test the ability of the RS to predict behavior in
hypothetical interpersonal scenarios in which individuals would
have to decide between either being real or not in situations in
which either response may come with risks. As a first step, the
items from the RS were translated by two bilingual researchers,
who then agreed on consensus items. The items were then back
translated by a third bilingual speaker, and checked for accuracy
against the original items. The German version of the measure
was then given to a sample of 204 participants from the general
population (142 women, 62 men) with an average age of
M = 31.3 years (range = 18 to 71, SD = 13.13). A model with one
substantive factor and one method factor where the reverse keyed
items were freed showed adequate fit (X2[48] = 123, RMSEA = 0.09,
CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.94, SRMR = 0.07]. The alpha was 0.85.
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Participants also completed measures of the big five (Danner
et al., 2019; alphas ranged from 0.80 to 0.89), interpersonal compe-
tence (Riemann & Allgöwer, 1993; a = 0.90), fear of negative eval-
uation (Kemper, Lutz, & Neuser, 2012, a = 0.87), and empathy
(Paulus, 2009; alpha = 0.75). Correlations with the RS are given in
Table 9. These results essentially replicate studies reported above
in English speaking samples that showed positive correlations
between realness and extraversion and negative correlations with
neuroticism. Correlations with openness and conscientiousness
were positive but not significant at p < .01, and the correlation with
agreeableness was negative but weakest in absolute value among
the big five traits. The results add to our previous findings by show-
ing that RS is related positively to interpersonal competence and
negatively related to fear of negative evaluation. Given the similar-
ity of empathy to agreeableness, we were not surprised to find
realness was not significantly correlated with empathy.
Study 9 participants were also asked to respond to nine scenar-
ios in which they could be real or not, in which either choice could
have a perceived cost. For each scenario there were two different
versions, one highlighting costs for self and the other highlighting
costs for others. The participants were divided randomly into two
subsamples (N = 107 and 97), for which the scenarios either
emphasized cost for the self or for the other. For instance, in one
scenario, the participant is told that they have accidentally shared
a friend’s secret, and are asked whether they tell the friend about
this. In one version of this scenario, the emphasis is placed on
the respondent’s discomfort discussing this with their friend (cost
for self), whereas in the other, emphasis is placed on how the
friend may feel hurt (cost for others). The respondents were then
asked how likely they would be ‘‘real” on a 4-point scale (in this
case, tell the friend). Alphas were 0.60 (self) and 0.61 (other) for
these scenarios. The RS correlated r = 0.58 and r = 0.55 for the self
and other scenarios, respectively, strongly supporting the validity
of the RS to predict reports of contextualized social behavior.
11. Discussion
At the moment, the world is awash in ‘‘fake news”, citizens are
routinely manipulated by politicians who do not mean what they
Table 8
Differences in peer ratings of a real and inauthentic friend.
‘‘Real” Friend ‘‘Inauthentic” Friend Cohen’s
Mean SD Mean SD d
Big Five Domains
Neuroticism 2.93 0.51 3.11 0.50 -0.35
Extraversion 3.45 0.50 3.14 0.52 0.60
Openness 3.22 0.43 3.26 0.40 -0.11
Agreeableness 3.13 0.58 3.68 0.53 -0.99
Conscientiousness 3.35 0.59 3.49 0.60 -0.23
Big Five Facets
Anxiety 3.04 0.83 3.65 0.73 -0.78
Anger 3.34 0.91 2.60 0.91 0.81
Depression 2.52 0.77 2.78 0.81 -0.34
Self-Consciousness 2.75 0.75 3.35 0.76 -0.79
Immoderation 3.14 0.67 3.03 0.68 0.17
Vulnerability 2.80 0.81 3.23 0.75 -0.55
Friendliness 3.47 0.75 3.34 0.77 0.17
Gregariousness 3.31 0.91 2.95 0.93 0.38
Assertiveness 3.70 0.77 2.81 0.85 1.11
Activity Level 3.23 0.64 3.08 0.66 0.23
Excitement Seeking 3.46 0.72 3.03 0.73 0.59
Cheerfulness 3.52 0.68 3.64 0.67 -0.18
Imagination 3.30 0.69 3.31 0.71 -0.03
Artistic Interest 3.23 0.79 3.45 0.75 -0.28
Emotionality 3.34 0.68 3.63 0.63 -0.44
Adventurousness 2.94 0.64 2.68 0.60 0.41
Intellect 3.30 0.77 3.20 0.74 0.14
Liberalism 3.19 0.64 3.30 0.56 -0.18
Trust 3.06 0.78 3.55 0.70 -0.67
Morality 3.39 0.83 3.77 0.78 -0.48
Altruism 3.42 0.73 3.91 0.64 -0.72
Cooperation 2.89 0.88 3.84 0.79 1.13
Modesty 2.71 0.85 3.35 0.83 -0.76
Sympathy 3.33 0.68 3.67 0.62 -0.52
Self-Efficacy 3.74 0.69 3.69 0.67 0.08
Orderliness 3.08 0.91 3.31 0.92 -0.25
Dutifulness 3.55 0.70 3.72 0.70 -0.24
Achievement 3.50 0.76 3.60 0.76 -0.13
Self-Discipline 3.33 0.75 3.37 0.74 -0.05
Cautiousness 2.91 0.91 3.25 0.88 -0.39
Honesty 3.03 0.67 3.26 0.68 -0.34
Values
Agency 5.59 1.70 4.73 1.57 0.52
Communion 5.90 1.52 6.65 1.36 -0.52
Table 9
Correlations between RS and individual difference measures in a German sample.
Measure r 95% CI p
Neuroticism -0.24 [-0.37, -0.11] < 0.01
Extraversion 0.46 [0.34, 0.56] < 0.01
Openness 0.17 [0.03, 0.30] 0.02
Agreeableness -0.11 [-0.24, 0.03] 0.13
Conscientiousness 0.16 [0.03, 0.30] 0.02
Competence 0.44 [0.32, 0.54] < 0.01
Fear of Negative Evaluation -0.44 [-0.55, -0.32] < 0.01
Empathy -0.05 [-0.19, 0.09] 0.46
* p < .01.
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say, and social media platforms incentivize virtue signaling and
punish straightforwardness. Although being ‘‘yourself” is often
extolled in modern society, it comes with social risks. It is these
moments of social risk that provide perhaps the most valid test
of whether a person is actually being real: a person who is only real
when it pays off is not really real at all.
This complexity is emphasized in classical psychological theo-
ries about authenticity and related concepts (congruence, genuine-
ness, transparency), yet contemporary research uses measures that
are strongly related to agreeableness, and which tend to mix con-
tent that is central to authentic behavior with content that is more
peripheral. We sought to identify, distinguish, and validate the ten-
dency to be real, the core individual difference variable underlying
authentic personality processes, which we define as doing on the
outside what one feels on the inside regardless of the proximal
social consequences.
Realness may be a particularly important individual difference
variable within certain domains of social behavior. For instance,
being real may be both harmful and beneficial for politicians, but
for citizens, it is a key characteristic of trust (Rosenblum et al.,
2019). As such, both actual demonstrations and (potentially inac-
curate) perceptions of realness are nearly always an important
consideration in the political sphere. Related, standing up to or
criticizing powerful people and institutions to promote social jus-
tice is socially risky, by definition. People who have been made
famous for doing so (e.g., Joan of Arc, Sitting Bull, Colin Kaepernick,
Thomas Paine, Rosa Parks, William Tell, Henry David Thoreau)
strike us as prototypically real – and they have historically experi-
enced both the costs and benefits of this trait. To the degree that
being real is an important ingredient for making the world a better
place, understanding and promoting realness at the individual
level may contribute to a more just society. At the same time, peo-
ple who both hold and express hateful, racist, and divisive beliefs
are also being real. As such, the social value of realness may depend
on the health of those inner qualities that support it, such as self-
awareness and capacity for reflection.
Realness may be particularly important in close relationships,
such as psychotherapy, romance, or parenting. Indeed, we would
hypothesize that, all things equal, most people would rather have
a close relationship with someone who is real than with someone
who is not. Again, however, we would expect that realness would
be particularly valued in close relationships when it is supported
by internal capacities for empathy and personal reflection. This
notion is captured by the idea that people generally prefer a friend
whose ‘‘heart is in the right place”.
These speculations point the way to future research that will
benefit from our generation of a unidimensional model of realness.
In these studies, realness was relatively stable, observable, predic-
tive of contextualized social behavior, positively associated with
adaptive functioning, and largely unrelated to concerns about
being agreeable vs. antagonistic, as predicted. These results have
implications for understanding individual differences in an impor-
tant pattern of social behavior and may help clarify disconnections
between classical theories and contemporary research on
authenticity.
11.1. Realness and authenticity
Authenticity has captured the attention of theorists and
researchers for decades, but it is a highly complex construct that
has proven difficult to study and around which no scholarly con-
sensus has emerged (Hicks et al., 2019). The authenticity literature
is somewhat disjointed, with measures that are similar but not
identical, and in which theory and research have parted ways in
important respects (Baumeister, 2019). Moreover, our results sug-
gest that existing measures deviate from classical theories about
authenticity in being strongly related to agreeable personality
characteristics.
Based on our literature review, we concluded that this was a
result of two main factors. The first was that existing measures
seem to capture some non-specific social desirability variance
that contributes to discriminant validity issues with respect to
agreeableness-related traits and behaviors. The second was the
effort to account for multiple internal and external features that
give rise to authentic behavior, even if they are supportive but
not essential. We understand authenticity as a relatively com-
plex, multi-component, within-person process involving dynamic
connections between internal states and external behavior.
Many of the existing authenticity measures were based on the-
ories that explicitly referenced such dynamic, multi-component,
within-person processes. These processes included some features
that seem central to authenticity (behavioral expressions of
inner states), as well as other features that may support
authentic behavior but in a somewhat non-specific way (e.g.,
self-awareness).
To be clear, we think that studying authenticity and all of the
processes that support it is an important endeavor for social scien-
tists. However, we concluded that, rather than trying to capture all
of the features involved in complex within-person authenticity
dynamics using measures designed to detect between-person dif-
ferences, it would be better to begin by isolating a core between-
person variable that is central to authentic behavior. A firm model
of individual differences in realness can help facilitate authenticity
research by distinguishing those individuals most likely to be real
in a given situation, and by providing a variable that can be used to
study the within-person contours of real behavior across time and
situations.
We found that realness content was present in existing multidi-
mensional measures of authenticity, but that it was also obscured
in measures with scales that focused on either internal character-
istics such as capacities for personal awareness, accurate percep-
tion, and reflective function, or external characteristics involving
explicit social behavior. While such characteristics, in combination,
may support authenticity, it is not being aware or behaving in a
certain way in isolation that provides evidence that someone is
authentic – it is the correspondence between these inner and outer
states. This correspondence could be labeled congruence or trans-
parency, terms which directly indicate the connection between
inner and outer states. However, the second obscuring factor was
that item content on existing measures tended to have a strong
positive valence. A consequence of this positive valence is that
authenticity measures tend to be strongly correlated with agree-
able traits. However, as described in detail above, this pattern of
correlation departs significantly from classical theories of authen-
ticity. An authentic person should be so whether or not there are
potential negative consequences. In fact, situations in which the
potential for negative consequences are present provide the truest
tests of authenticity. We refer to this tendency to be transparent or
congruent without regard for social consequences as realness. By
realness, we simply mean that when a person reveals everything
they think, feel, and want on the inside to others in a way that is
direct and straightforward, they are being real; when they conceal
such features, they are being fake.
To be clear, realness does not solve all of the problems with
authenticity. A significant hurdle is that the validity of realness
scores depends on the rater having a valid account of inner states.
Generally speaking, the self is the best source of information about
inner states, although individuals may have not accurately report
them for a variety of reasons. Observers and informants, in con-
trast, may not share all of the self’s blind spots, but they also do
not have direct access to the target’s inner states. It may be possi-
ble to create experimental approaches to test the relevance of
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self-insight to some degree (e.g., by manipulating inner states
directly via priming techniques), which would be an important
direction for future work.
One specific way in which realness may be different from
authenticity occurs when a person has two motives. For instance,
a person may disapprove of someone else’s behavior but also value
social harmony, and expect that expressing that disapproval would
create disharmony. It is not clear whether expressing disapproval
or not would be the most authentic behavior in this situation.
However, the most real response would be to both express disap-
proval and also express the desire to maintain social harmony. To
the extent that either of these inner states or motives are con-
cealed, the response is not real (but still could potentially be
authentic in at least some sense). Future work focused on the
how people express themselves when their motives conflict would
be informative about both realness and the broader concept of
authenticity.
11.2. Correlates of individual differences in realness
We found that individual differences in realness were strongly
related to variation in existing measures of authenticity and corre-
lated with high levels of extraversion, openness, conscientiousness,
honesty, dominance, internal locus of control, and interpersonal
competence. Realness was negatively associated with neuroticism,
a range of maladaptive personality characteristics, interpersonal
problems, self-monitoring, and fear of negative evaluation; and it
was largely unrelated to agreeableness, although the pattern of
results was complicated, as we will discuss in more detail below.
Overall, this pattern of correlations suggests that people who are
more real tend to have more adaptive personalities. This is consis-
tent with classic theories that postulate that realness is an out-
growth of psychological maturity (e.g., Horney, 1951; Maslow,
1968). However, as discussed above, this may depend on the level
of health of inner characteristics such as self-awareness and capac-
ity for reflection and emotion regulation. In other words, it may be
the case that realness is adaptive among healthy, prosocially moti-
vated individuals, whereas it is maladaptive or even pernicious
among people who are less well-developed or antisocial. Indeed,
we note that children are often seen as characteristically ‘‘real”,
despite not having developed personalities. Given that both classi-
cal theory and our data imply but do not prove that realness is an
outcome of healthy maturation, genetically-informed develop-
mental data would be useful for better understanding the sources
of individual differences in the construct (Wagner et al., 2020), and
future research should seek to distinguish being real from the
healthy inner capacities that support personal and interpersonal
adaptation.
Although we conceptualize realness as an individual differ-
ence construct, we also wish to emphasize that it is importantly
different from the big five or analogous personality traits.
Personality traits such as those in the big five indicate the ten-
dency to behave in a certain way, relative to others, across time
and situations. For instance, people who are high in extraversion
are more extraverted than most other people in most situations.
In contrast, realness is a contingent construct, in that it is only
possible to test whether someone is real when social risk is pre-
sent. As such, it is most telling to observe realness when the
relevant costs are present. In an individual difference measure
such as the RS, this can be specified in the items themselves.
In observational or experimental work, this would have to be
taken into account in other ways, such as the manipulation of
scenarios so as to create social risk. This would be a fruitful
avenue for future research because it would help inform the
mechanics of real behavior, and help distinguish it from other
kinds of traits.
11.3. Realness and conceptually similar constructs
Some of the modest correlations between realness and concep-
tually similar constructs are important for understanding the dif-
ference between realness and other aspects of authenticity. For
example, honesty as conceptualized on the HEXACO is a relatively
instrumental trait with significant positive valence (e.g., If I knew
that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million
dollars (reverse), I wouldn’t use flattery to get a raise or a promo-
tion at work, even if I thought it would succeed). In contrast, the
social costs of realness are embedded in the items of the RS, which
also focus on being real for its own sake, as opposed to the instru-
mental utility of the alternative. To be concrete, HEXACO honesty
might be better at capturing the tendency (not) to use subterfuge
in order to get something or impress someone, RS realness might
be better at capturing the tendency to act according to inner expe-
rience regardless of personal or social consequences.
Self-monitoring is another conceptually similar but somewhat
broader and empirically distinct construct. Self-monitoring focuses
on behavioral expression, and particularly non-verbal expressions
(Snyder, 1974). Moreover, the absence of self-monitoring can func-
tion to be either real or non-real. For instance, according to Snyder
(1974), one of ‘‘the goals of self-monitoring may be to communi-
cate accurately one’s true emotional state”. In other words, for a
person who is characteristically deceptive or fake, an absence of
self-monitoring would tend to contribute to being less real. Over-
all, we see self-monitoring as capturing some aspects of being real
in the sense that the absence of self-monitoring is thought to pro-
duce a tight, non-reflected connection between internal states and
outward behavior, but that the concept also includes some of the
internal features depicted in Fig. 1, and may not necessarily be
associated with being real in any particular situation. The relatively
modest correlation between realness and self-monitoring in study
3 is consistent with this interpretation.
Disinhibition, a third conceptually similar construct, is a broad
trait involving impulsive behavior. It tends to be associated with
negative outcomes such as externalizing psychopathology
(Patrick et al., 2013), and tends to decrease normatively with age
(Vaidya, Latzman, Markon, & Watson, 2010). There is a similarity
between being real and being disinhibited, because both of these
concepts involve a connection between inner states and behavioral
expression. However, disinhibition is broader and more maladap-
tive, and thought to reflect a kind of psychological immaturity or
underdevelopment. For instance, whereas disinhibition is a strong
predictor of substance use (Iacono, Malone, & McGue, 2008), we
would not expect realness to be related to substance use. Instead,
we would expect people who are real to use substances if they feel
like using them, and not use substances if they don’t, whereas we
would expect disinhibited people to experience an urge to use sub-
stances that they find difficult to control. Disinhibition has been
conceptualized as low conscientiousness (Clark & Watson, 2008);
in this study the RS was consistently albeit modestly negatively
correlated with conscientiousness, supporting the empirical dis-
tinction between realness and disinhibition.
11.4. Realness and agreeableness
One of the main motivations for this research was our observa-
tion that classical theories of authenticity emphasized the poten-
tially disagreeable aspects of realness (e.g., Maslow, 1968)
whereas existing measures of authenticity had uniformly positive
correlations with individual differences in agreeable behavior
(e.g., Pinto et al., 2012). We concluded that this discrepancy may
be due, at least in part, to social desirability. Generally speaking,
authenticity and agreeableness are both positive characteristics,
and thus items designed to assess them might contain
C.J. Hopwood, E.W. Good, A.A. Levendosky et al. Journal of Research in Personality 92 (2021) 104086
14
non-specific positive valence, creating a correlation between the
two constructs (Baumeister, 2019; Jongman-Sereno & Leary, 2016).
Comparisons of validity correlations from self, informant, and
peer-nomination data were used to disentangle social desirability
effects. The self-report correlation between realness and agree-
ableness was negligible. The correlation between informant-rated
realness and informant-rated agreeableness was positive, which
may suggest that informants would generally prefer their friends
to be real. This interpretation is consistent with assertions by the-
orists like Rogers (1961) regarding the interpersonal importance of
being real. However, when given a forced choice between a real
and a polite friend, both of whom the rater likes, informants rated
the polite friend as substantially more agreeable than the real
friend. This pattern can be summarized as follows: people who
are more real do not tend to see themselves as more agreeable,
but people tend to see realness in their friends as more agreeable
than otherwise, while also recognizing that it is less agreeable to
be real than to be polite.
Longitudinal and experimental work would be useful for further
disentangling realness from disagreeableness, from the perspective
of both the self and others. Further refinement of the measurement
of these constructs may also be useful. Specifically, it may be that
realness is experienced as warm or communal in a deep sense,
even if it is not agreeable in the more superficial sense. Colloqui-
ally, people often experience gratitude when others are ‘‘real” with
them, presumably because they attribute that realness to some
kind of deep or lasting concern. Given the possibility that perceived
agreeableness and realness reflect different levels of psychological
functioning, it may not make sense to measure themwith the same
kinds of tools (Leary, 1957), and it may be profitable to develop
techniques that distinguish deeper, motivational aspects of behav-
ior from more visible, superficial aspects.
11.5. Realness, context, and states
One interesting finding from recent research is that people tend
to report feeling more authentic when they are their best selves,
not their most typical selves, in social situations (Beer & Harris,
2019; Fleeson & Wilt, 2010). This speaks to the valence effect dis-
cussed above – people want to believe they are their best selves
deep inside, which includes being authentic (Hicks, Schlegel, &
Newman, 2019), and there is a fairly consensual model of what
the best self is (Bleidorn et al., 2019). This may help explain why
ratings of authenticity and ratings of adaptive personality traits,
including agreeableness, converge at a very general level.
But a different and perhaps more interesting behavioral ques-
tion is, in the moment when the crisis strikes, are you real
(Sedikides et al., 2019)? Being real in this sense is not the same
thing as behaving according to one’s typical trait levels, being the
same way across all situations, or being the best version of your-
self. As inner feelings may change dramatically across situations
or roles, then behavior must correspondingly change, given that
realness is defined by the congruence between inner and outer
states. Realness is consistency with how one feels in a given
moment, which itself might change across situations, and which
may deviate from typical traits. A related question is, what if a per-
son has an internal conflict and their behavior only corresponds to
one side of that conflict? We would argue that this would be only
partly real, and to be fully real, one should outwardly express both
aspects of their internal conflict.
Longitudinal and contextualized, multi-method data are needed
to test these kinds of hypotheses. We did not consider how contex-
tual factors such as relationship closeness or hierarchy (Chen,
2019), the match between internal and external states (Eastwick,
Finkel, & Simpson, 2019), relationship dynamics (Finkel, 2019),
internal conflict (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), or the level of support
in the environment (Ryan & Ryan, 2019) affect realness. We antic-
ipate that, like other traits, realness will be strongly impacted by
both individual differences and situational dynamics. In this set
of studies, we focused on individual differences and learned very
little about situational dynamics. By generating a valid measure
of realness that can be administered as a self-report, informant-
report or behavioral observation tool, we have we have provided
a method for capturing this core feature of authentic behavior
and set the stage for work on the manifestation and dynamics of
realness states in actual social contexts.
11.6. Limits to generalizability
These studies were conducted exclusively in WEIRD samples in
two countries. It would be important to examine howwell the con-
cept of realness generalizes to other cultures in terms of content
validity, measurement invariance, and patterns of correlation
before generalizing these results to people, in general. Even within
these countries, efforts were not specifically made to examine how
realness functions across important sub-segments of the popula-
tion (e.g., different ethnicities or social classes). This is a related
and important area for future work. It seems plausible that, within
WEIRD countries, people with different backgrounds are more
likely to exhibit realness than others. For instance, it may be that
people with more historical or personal privilege experience rela-
tively less social risk in being real than people from underrepre-
sented or underprivileged groups. Extending from this idea is the
possibility that certain known groups might be particularly high
(e.g., counselors) or low (e.g., thieves) in realness. Studies sampling
such groups would provide a novel means of validating and study-
ing realness.
11.7. Conclusion
Our goal was to establish the construct of realness, or the ten-
dency to act on the outside the way one feels on the inside regard-
less of social consequences. This is in contrast to fakeness, in which
a person conceals certain aspects of the inner experience. A person
who hides their thoughts, feelings, or motives from others is
plainly not being real. Realness has mostly been studied in the con-
text of authenticity, a complex within-person process often mea-
sured with tools that do not align in certain ways with classical
theories. In particular, these measures try to capture a multicom-
ponent temporal process using cross-sectional questionnaires,
and to be saturated with positive valence, including agreeableness.
As such, realness is somewhat obscured in contemporary authen-
ticity research. In this study, we isolated realness within the gen-
eral domain of authenticity, developed a tool that could be used
to measure relatively stable individual differences in realness from
the perspective of the self, informants, or observers, and estab-
lished its properties. This sets the stage for future work on authen-
tic social processes, and in particular the sources, correlates, costs,
and benefits of being real.
Appendix:. Realness scale
Please read the following statements and use the scale provided
to indicate how accurate each statement is of you, in general.
Scale: False, Slightly True, Mainly True, Very True
At times I say what people want to hear rather than what I
want. (r)
I do what works best for the situation even if it is not how I feel.
(r)
Others might see me as fake. (r)
It would take a lot for me to tell someone they have hurt me. (r)
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I tell the truth even if it makes others unhappy.
I say what I believe even if people don’t like it.
I sometimes act like I believe what others believe. (r)
I tend to tell others exactly what I think even if it causes conflict.
I avoid sharing desires that others may not approve of. (r)
I express my needs and desires directly.
I share my feelings with others even if it upsets them.
I tell people what I want even if they may not want the same
thing.
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